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1London governance and the politics of neighbourhood planning: a 
case for investigation
Graham Pycock: University of Westminster 
ABSTRACT
The Localism Act 2011 has successfully devolved planning powers to over 
2500 English communities, involving 14 million people, with over 750 ‘made’ 
neighbourhood plans legitimised by referendum.  In London however there are less 
than one tenth of the made plans than in the rest of England.  Institutional resistance 
and policy choices may be implicated.  Two comprehensive studies of 
neighbourhood planning in England are reviewed, which both highlight the 
disadvantages citizen-planners suffer in cities, compared to county areas with parish 
councils.  The extent of support (a statutory obligation) of the local planning authority 
is found to be a crucial factor in determining progress, and evidence is found of 
some London boroughs covertly impeding local groups.  Theorisation is considered 
by reference to a range of academic studies of localism and neighbourhood planning 
in addition to the two key reports.  Issues about social deprivation and unequal 
access are recurrent with political implications which may help explain opposition to 
neighbourhood planning.  Theoretical distinctions made between ‘representative’ and 
‘community’ forms of localism, and objections to ‘anti-political’ effects are noted.  
There has been remarkably little research into London borough governance 
generally, and into neighbourhood planning in particular.  Based upon evidence of 
widely varying and arguably perverse governance practice, a study of localism in the 
capital is called for.
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INTRODUCTION
‘Double devolution’ is a term coined by David Milliband, which neatly denoted 
a reform of the tiers of governance to empower local communities; ‘I call it “double 
devolution” - not just devolution that takes power from central government and gives 
it to local government, but power that goes from local government down to local 
people, providing a critical role for individuals and neighbourhoods’ (Milliband 2006).  
This ideal was widely welcomed at the time, but despite the 2011 Localism Act, 
evidence suggests that the second stage, of power to the people, is faltering and that 
local government may be the impediment in some places.  The Localism Act 2011 
(with all-party support) provides for a raft of public rights, with neighbourhood 
planning as the leading edge provision of devolution to local communities.  There are 
two well-resourced, empirical reviews of how the 2011 localism legislation has been 
implemented in England.  The first, called the ‘User Experience’ report, by Parker et 
al (2014), investigated actively engaged communities.  In reviewing neighbourhood 
2planning in practice, it was intended to draw lessons so as to guide government 
policy and inform further legislation, which the ‘User Experience’ report successfully 
did.  The second report, ‘People Power’, produced by an expert commission, chaired 
by Lord Kerslake, also focussed on the practice of neighbourhood planning in 
England (Locality 2018).  This was on a smaller scale and was undoubtedly 
predisposed towards communities taking up this third tier of devolved planning 
powers.  A third-sector body called ‘Locality’ funded both reports.  Locality is 
sponsored by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, and is 
charged with supporting local groups taking up rights under the Localism Act.  The 
reports found, in common, positive experiences but uneven take-up of planning 
powers, with issues about the inclusivity and legitimacy of local groups.  Both reports 
emphasised that the local council is a crucial determining factor in the successful 
achievement of neighbourhood planning by; in rural areas a parish council or in 
urban areas a ‘designated’ neighbourhood forum.  There may be a direct relationship 
between the degree of local government support and the extent of take-up of 
neighbourhood planning, with both reports detecting obstruction by some councils 
and the existence of stalled groups.  
Neither report focussed on London nor identified it as atypical, but the capital 
city is however patently anomalous.  From the evidence, there appears to be a 
substantial devolution deficit, with a lower volume of neighbourhood planning activity.  
The number of ‘made’ plans is ten times higher in England as a whole, than in 
London.  This is based upon data indicating 11 made neighbourhood plans in 
London (Neighbourhood Planners, London 2018), and national data indicating over 
700 made plans in England (Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local 
Government 2018) and calculated from Office for National Statistics regional 
population figures for 2016 (Office for National Statistics 2018).  There is an obvious 
question about the role of London’s governance in this retarded performance.  It is 
questionable whether the 2011 model of devolved local planning is actually 
sustainable in the capital, with nil activity in some boroughs.  In what follows, a 
theoretical context is supplied, and explanation is sought, from a review of research 
into neighbourhood planning, mainly conducted by academic urban planners and 
geographers.  Such evidence as is available in London is reviewed with a primary 
focus on governance and the conduct of the borough councils.  Non-governance 
explanations of the London anomaly include the socio-economic and demographic 
demand side and whether Londoners actually have an appetite for do-it-yourself 
town planning.  “Yes we do”, does appear to be the answer, but the state of the art in 
London localism is poorly researched.  By reviewing the two major reports and some 
of the theorisation, a contextual national synopsis emerges.  There are frequently 
occurring objections to neighbourhood planning, made on pragmatic and on 
ideological grounds.  Such objections may be informing the London policy 
community and also the professional and political disposition of London local 
government as an institution.  Enquiry is called for into the inhibition of community-
based planning apparently extant in London’s governance.
3NEIGHBOURHOOD PLANNING IN ENGLAND: THE USER EXPERIENCE 
REPORT (2014) AND FOLLOW-UP (2017) 
Research for the comprehensive User Experience report was conducted three 
years prior to the Locality Commission study and remains the largest source of 
primary data (Parker et al 2014).  The neighbourhood planning provisions, by far the 
most important and politically significant part of the 2011 Act, are the focus of this 
definitive progress check and analysis.  A follow-up review was carried out in 2016 
(Parker and Wargent 2017).  The User Experience of Neighbourhood Planning in 
England study was sponsored by Locality on behalf of the government and 
employed a telephone survey of 120 local planning groups together with six focus 
groups.  Out of 737 active planning groups, 120 were sampled for the survey.  At the 
time, London was the second biggest region by population (an estimated 8.8 million) 
but encompassed fewer planning groups than the other nine regions except the 
North East (with a population of only 2.6 million) (Westminster 2017).  London had 
less than one fifth of the groups, in proportion to population, as the South East (with 
the highest absolute number of groups).  The data was ‘informally gathered’ (Parker 
et al 2014 p.10) and neither participation rates by population nor the distinct lack of 
progress in London are definitively quantified.  This London anomaly, of low take-up, 
or ‘devolution deficit’, was not acknowledged.   The User Experience study employed 
100 items in the telephone survey which supplied a rich source of data including 
comparison of local authority support with progress made in planning. Six focus 
groups were also convened by the 2014 User survey.  One of these, called the 
‘stalled area’ group, comprised community groups which were initially interested, but 
did not embark upon, or progress, the planning process.  This is particularly 
interesting, and these few groups were identified from their enquiries made for 
professional advice from Planning Aid or Locality.  There may be a national cohort of 
hidden stalled groups, in which the London component is likely to be 
disproportionately numerous.  A key issue is that in much of rural England there are 
pre-existing parish councils, whereas in London and other cities communities have 
initially to define themselves, with an agreed boundary, and gain designation from 
the borough council as suitable bodies.  When designated they are titled as 
‘neighbourhood forums’.  Sturzaker et al (2019) discern this rural / urban difference 
and note the significant role of the local authority.  The government anticipated that 
neighbourhood forums would encounter more difficulties than parish councils, and 
this was ameliorated by the supply of a higher level of grant assistance.  While 
London is lagging way behind in any case, the typical difference in progress between 
parish councils and neighbourhood forums nationally has not been quantified.  
Research access to non-starter or stalled groups in London would be needed to 
investigate the full reasons, but to date an unknown number of community groups in 
the capital are stalled and effectively remain voiceless.
The 120 groups surveyed by telephone in the User Experience study were 
definitively successful groups.  They were asked: how the process had gone, stage 
4by stage; what advice had been used; the effect on community relations; and so on.  
As an example of what was found, 86% of parishes and 71% of forums reported that 
formal consultation had gone ‘well’ (Parker et al 2014 p.40).  The focus group 
responses were summarised so as to supply a qualitative assessment from each 
type of area; ‘urban disadvantaged’, ‘growth’ and so on.  Common themes emerged.  
Peoples’ aspiration for a neighbourhood plan, was attributed to its statutory status, 
and its scope for control over the; ‘type, design and location of development in their 
neighbourhood’.  A frequent desire was expressed for better local authority attitudes 
and behaviours, with, ‘a more organised and clear set of obligations around the duty 
to support’ (Parker et al 2014 p.64).   The urban areas focus group (which 
presumably included some London groups) found consensus that, ‘Local Authority 
support, both in tangible forms but also in terms of attitude was critical’ (Parker et al 
2014 p.92).  There were only three groups in the ‘stalled groups’ focus group, but it is 
perhaps surprising that there were any at all.  Generally, local authorities were seen 
as, ‘not ready to actively support neighbourhood planning’ (Parker et al 2014 p.107).  
These three may represent the tip of an iceberg.  The report notes that overall the 
evidence suggests; ‘Neighbourhood planning can be undertaken by most 
communities if effectively supported, and in particular if the relevant local authority is 
supportive’ (Parker et al 2014 p.75).  Additionally, although the community initiates 
neighbourhood planning, ‘in practice successful neighbourhood planning is co-
produced’ (Parker et al 2014 p.76).  The follow-up study conducted in 2016 carried 
out 36 telephone interviews with groups which had advanced thorough the process.  
Half of these now had a ‘made’ (passed the local referendum) plan with statutory 
force (Parker and Wargent 2017).  Although 92% of the groups indicated that the 
process was more burdensome than expected, 82% would recommend other 
communities to develop a local plan.  Suggestions are advanced in the report for 
changes at each stage of the planning process, for example more use of consultants 
and templates for actual plan writing.  On the critical issue of local authority support, 
78% of groups reported that the authority had been somewhat or very supportive, 
but 11% indicated they had received no support and another 11% (four groups) felt 
their authority had been obstructive.  These negative experiences were ascribed to, 
‘slow decision making, failure to provide detailed guidance, or lack of dedicated 
resources’.  The report acknowledged that this ‘may be influencing take-up 
elsewhere and should be explored further’ (Parker and Wargent 2017 p.5).  The 
original finding, that the local authorities’ statutory ‘duty to support’ should be 
clarified, was endorsed by 89% of the groups.  In conclusion, the report suggests 
that this council support ‘continues to be the overriding variable in the speed and 
success of neighbourhood plans’ (Parker and Wargent 2017 p.6).  Later follow-up 
analysis of the User Experience survey and other research has noted the absence of 
explicit criteria for success.  An agenda for improving policy and practice for 
neighbourhood planning, ‘re-imagined’ has been produced, which suggests better 
‘co-production’ by the community with the local council (Wargent and Parker 2018). 
5AN APPRAISAL OF NEIGHBOURHOOD PLANNING AND A CALL FOR ACTION: 
THE LOCALITY COMMISSION (2018)
Six years after the passage of the 2011 Localism Act, a comprehensive 
review was thought timely by Locality into the practicalities and take-up of the 
statutory community rights on offer.  Surprisingly, no direct reference is made in the 
commission report to the earlier User Experience study.  The commission of enquiry 
into the Future of Localism was conducted in 2017 and reported in February 2018 
(Locality 2018).  The Localism Act confers planning and land use rights on local 
communities, which were intended to deliver ‘a fundamental shift of power…. 
towards local people’ (HM Government 2010 p.11).   Concern about limited impact 
and uneven public engagement soon became commonplace however, expressed in 
academic literature and also voiced by community activists, politicians and 
commentators alike; see for example the Mayor of Hackney objecting that the Act, 
‘does not challenge the deep-rooted centralisation in the UK’ (Pipe 2013).  The then 
Department for Communities and Local Government later reinforced the 2011 Act 
with the Neighbourhood Planning Act 2017 (informed by the User Experience study), 
but these provisions were more by way of a tidying up; by tightening deadlines for 
councils, giving more weight to neighbourhood plans, together with some 
reinforcement of housing requirements.  The key question posed by the Locality 
Commission was how far and with what result had the would-be empowered 
communities in England taken advantage of the 2011 rights.  Importantly these rights 
are collective, conferred on communities (parish councils or neighbourhood forums), 
not individuals.  The commission, led by Lord Bob Kerslake, former Head of the Civil 
Service, was independent, although it is reasonable to describe the eight 
commissioners as enthusiasts, already fully convinced of the benefits of localism.  
Their inclinations were underpinned by evidence of popular support for greater 
devolution (Locality 2018a):
Table: Locality Commission on the Future of Localism.  YouGov poll of 1,628 adults
CURRENTLY HAS MOST 
SAY IN LOCAL AREA
SHOULD HAVE MOST SAY 
IN THE LOCAL AREA
National Government 25% 3%
Local Government 49% 26%
Local People 3% 57%
So, by way of endorsement of the Act, they state their desire for, ‘power to be 
pushed down to the local level, unleashing the creativity and expertise of 
communities’ (Locality 2018 p.5).  The legislation was designed to drive a genuinely 
community-led democratic revival.  Insofar as progress in this intended shift of power 
6is limited, could the Act be deemed a partial failure?  The commission finds that the 
promise of the legislation ‘has not been achieved’ (Locality 2018 p.4), evaluating that 
the framework of rights ‘stops short of enabling the fundamental shift in power that is 
needed’ (Locality 2018 p.21).  Evidence was taken from 22 organisations together 
with online survey responses.  It was found that the most important and best known 
right, to produce a neighbourhood plan, has seen some success.  This is continuing 
with currently over 2500 communities in England (representing nearly 14 million 
people) developing their own statutory local plan, with over 700 passed by local 
referendum (Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government 2018).  
Neighbourhood planning has nevertheless been inhibited in various ways and there 
has been little take-up of the other community rights.  The Right to Bid, where the 
community can register an ‘Asset of Community Value’ (mainly pubs threatened with 
closure) and raise funds to purchase the building, has seen limited success.  The 
Right to Challenge, and take over a local service, has resulted in ‘little or no impact’ 
(Locality 2018 p.31).  A variety of obstacles were identified.  The issue of community 
capacity is central.  Capacity encompasses technical and professional skills, 
resources, volunteer time and networks.  Neighbourhood planning in particular is 
dependent upon this social capital.  The limited and untargeted national support 
programme for communities (supplied through the government appointed body, 
Locality), is noted, in the context of continuing local government austerity (Locality 
2018 p.31).  Research has frequently highlighted the community capacity issue, 
identifying inequalities between areas and uneven participation within areas.  This 
has been quantified by Parker and Salter (2017 p.484) who found that 7.5% of 
planning groups were in the lowest quartile of multiple deprivation (IMD 5) but 25.8% 
in the top quartile (IMD1).  A second issue identified by the commission is the bundle 
of problems posed by unsympathetic local authorities, ‘in too many areas public 
bodies remain top down and risk averse’ (Locality 2018 p.12).  Poor access to 
information and lack of accountability are complained of.  The attitude and culture of 
the local council was found to be crucial and widely varying, from strong official 
support, to actual obstruction.  The commission is insistent on the need to; ‘change 
local government behaviour and practice to enable local initiatives to thrive’ (Locality 
2018 p.3).  The study is underpinned by apposite evidence, supplied by active and 
committed participants; both citizen volunteers and professional practitioners.  Well-
founded recommendations arise across the range of localism policies and activities.  
Findings are supplemented by reference to relevant academic research and 
authoritative sources.  The report is essentially interpretive in its appraisal of the 
efficacy of the range of community rights.  This evidence-based diagnosis leads to 
four defined domains for strengthening or ‘reimagining’ localism.  These are; an 
integrated structure of good local governance; suitable resources and powers 
available to communities; stronger devolved relationships; and the development of 
community capacity. 
Taken overall, the commission supplies a community activists’ perspective on 
localism, which identifies a culpable local government, inhibiting empowerment.  
7Instrumental outcomes in terms of land use planning are not reviewed.  There is no 
attempt at theorisation, about the governance implications of community-based 
initiatives, nor about the impact upon the communities which engage.  In particular, 
analysis of agency and social capital are not attempted, although the desirability of 
building participative democracy is advanced.  The main contribution is in resolving 
complex implementation and policy issues into an evidenced and clear depiction of 
the state of the art in localism, together with some detailed and pragmatic policy 
prescriptions.  There is criticism of the design of the Act as well as of the 
government’s inconsistent commitment to devolution.  In particular it is noted that the 
2011 Act, and the Big Society agenda which framed the legislation, were not 
accompanied by, ‘a programme of significant investment for capacity building 
commensurate with the scale of the challenge’ (Locality 2018 p.31).  Targeted 
regeneration initiatives, focussing on areas of multiple deprivations ended in 2010, to 
be replaced by a universal but permissive provision which leads to greater inequality 
of participation.  The problem was compounded by simultaneous and cumulative 
reductions in local government funding (Lowndes and Gardner 2016).  Even so, the 
majority of the report’s recommendations concern the conduct of local government.  
Principles for neighbourhood governance are set out to meet the current challenges.  
Such challenges include, ‘lack of new leadership; partisan interests overriding 
commitment to place; lack of participation; and inability to effectively engage the 
community’ (Locality 2018 p.19).  There is a warning that in the absence of genuine 
collaboration there is a risk of reinforcing disengagement.  Recommendations, for 
strengthening the legislative framework, are set out, such as; a requirement for 
councils actually to publicise statutory localism rights; making it easier to establish 
parish councils; and extending the powers of designated neighbourhood forums in 
cities.  The culture of local government however is seen to be crucial.  Devolution of 
council budgets and local procurement are suggested as a means of reinforcing 
localism.  Partnership with community organisations is advocated by, ‘co-production’ 
in design and delivery of local services and the creation of, ‘non-hierarchical spaces 
for community debate and decision making’ (Locality 2018 p.23).  Idealistically, as a 
counter to excessively partisan politics, it is argued that, ‘deliberative, participatory 
and place-based local democracy can unlock creativity, unity and community energy 
and harness the skills and tools for citizens to lead change in their local area’ 
(Locality 2018 p.37).
Some weaknesses in the commission’s report can be identified.  The 
particular circumstances in London are not referred to even though it is commonly 
understood that take-up of localism is much slower here than elsewhere.  In fact one 
of three focus group events was held in London.  However with a form of recruitment 
by open invitation, failed or slow groups (arguably characteristic of the London 
experience) are unlikely to be represented.  There is a natural bias in both reports 
towards participation by the successful groups, often professionally represented.  An 
issue arises here about ‘voice’ and authenticity, when consultants often speak for the 
supposedly empowered citizen volunteers.  Struggling volunteers, perhaps 
8numerous in London, are unlikely to have the time or the inclination to attend ‘show 
and tell’ events.  The commission’s emphasis is upon experience in the English 
counties, and on parish councils, rather than neighbourhood forum experiences in 
London.  Even the parish councils, it is argued, require better support from their 
higher-tier authorities and some are seen to be ineffective.  Without a parish council, 
an urban community group, wishing to embark on a neighbourhood plan, must self-
determine and agree a boundary and then demonstrate it is a fit and proper body.  
Only thus can it obtain ‘designation’ from the council as a ‘neighbourhood forum’, to 
start the planning process.  Parish councils on the other hand are already endowed 
with: a boundary; professional administration (their clerks); public funding with a 
bank account and authority to spend (the council tax precept); together with formal 
status and legitimacy (they are statutory bodies which are normally elected).  Any 
urban group of public-spirited citizens has merely an informal shadow of this 
resource and authority.  They are ill-equipped on their own to devise neighbourhood 
plan policies, achieve popular support and pass technical examination.  Although up 
to £15,000 in government grant and plenty of advice is available to a neighbourhood 
forum, full political and bureaucratic support from the local council for such 
volunteers has been found to be essential.  The commission devoted only two short 
paragraphs specifically to the urban-based neighbourhood forums despite their 
manifest disadvantages.  It is suggested that there is, ‘scope for increasing powers 
which designated forums could take-on around spending and service delivery’ 
(Locality 2018 p.38).  But in swathes of London and indeed in whole boroughs, 
designated neighbourhood forums do not yet exist at all.  The report explores 
concerns about the deficiencies of local government voiced by successful groups, 
both parish councils and forums.  The urban groups face a different order of problem 
from rural groups and are especially dependent upon their local authority.  The report 
does contain plenty of best practice guidance and good advice about how local 
authorities might better support localism.  This is based upon the experience and 
evidence from successful planning groups, which have the wherewithal to contribute 
to the research.  The commission is remiss in not seeking out the hidden stories; of 
the poorly organised, the under-resourced, the frustrated and the otherwise 
unrepresented.  Evidence is emerging to suggest that some London councils have 
exercised their power and discretion wilfully to obstruct local groups.  There is barely 
a hint of this in the Locality report.  It is ironic that the report warns about 
neighbourhood planning being dominated by, ‘those with the loudest voices and 
those that have the confidence, skills, wealth and time to participate’ (Locality 2018 
p.16), given that it mainly attended to the successful and vocal groups.  
Nevertheless, the commissioners and contributors have produced an eloquent 
defence of localism and a persuasive call to re-invigorate the initiative.  
A CRITIQUE OF NEIGHBOURHOOD PLANNING: THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVES
9Theoretical contributions will be reviewed here, initially from the local 
government perspective, then taking in the useful notions of community and 
representative forms of localism, and finally considering views of localism from the 
more to less sceptical.  Progress in neighbourhood planning in London is retarded 
and anomalous, and council policy may be implicated.  This may be reflective of the 
local government perception of localism with neighbourhood planning as the leading 
edge.  Planning was a shrewd choice for radical localism, since the resourcing 
issues and accountabilities associated with service delivery are avoided.  But 
‘localism’ as a term has been employed somewhat generically and often 
appropriated as a prerogative of local government, rather than as an empowered 
space available to the community.  For example, the Local Government Information 
Unit, in ‘Reviving localism: Three challenges’ restricts the notion entirely to powers 
and funding made available to local government from Whitehall (Walker et al 2013).  
This could be termed single devolution.  As another example, in a paper entitled 
‘Who is accountable for localism?’ five different models of localism, proposed as a 
heuristic or diagnostic tool, were institutionally-based in local government.  The view 
was advanced that citizen-led collaboration is a possibility, but only included in one 
model of the five.  This latter model is defined as ‘polycentric governance’.  
Otherwise representative local government is dominant throughout the typology 
(Richardson and Durose 2013).  Such definitions of institutionally-led localism are 
inconsistent with the 2011 Localism Act, ostensibly empowering citizens to exercise 
rights for themselves.  From the local government viewpoint, it is common to find the 
assumption that agency for localism is confined within institutional boundaries.  
There is a political tension and a discontinuity between the two ideas; that the 
initiative for localism is retained by the formal institution of representative 
government; or that the initiative can be directly seized by a citizenry, entitled by 
legislation.  This blind spot from the local government perspective is well illustrated 
by a recent study of devolution and local government, which describes localism as a 
‘myth’, and reviews the minor provisions of the 2011 Act without any mention of 
neighbourhood planning at all (Leach et al 2018).  In any case large urban 
authorities do appear to be disinclined to exploit the double devolution potential of 
neighbourhood planning.  Salter classifies a range of local government responses to 
neighbourhood planning in the South East, which recognise the reality of double 
devolution.  A minority, employing a ‘deflective response’, are; ‘actively discouraging 
groups from taking up neighbourhood planning’ (Salter 2018 p.346).  This response 
may be more prevalent in urban areas without parish councils.  There is now a great 
deal of research with which to inform local government policy-makers and 
professionals, ranging from the more generic localism literature to more recent 
research specifically into neighbourhood planning.    Differences in research 
perspective exist in the localism literature about the contribution and value of 
neighbourhood planning.  There is an obvious distinction between the two empirical 
and synoptic survey-based reports from Locality and Parker et al, reviewed earlier, 
and academic research which is theoretically grounded, reviewed below.  Some 
research, more normatively situated, is explicitly sceptical about neighbourhood 
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planning, most is nuanced, and some literature might be taken as endorsement.  
Parker’s et al User Experience study, already reviewed, is strictly empirical with a 
pragmatic range of recommendations for improvement in policy and practice.  But 
Parker and his co-authors have also produced a canon of dedicated research and 
reports, which has incorporated the gamut of critical thinking on localism and 
neighbourhood planning.  Even so, there remains a dearth of applied research and 
grounded theorisation about neighbourhood level planning in UK cities in the context 
of local governance.  
Both the commission and user reports supply a similar and descriptive 
synthesis, identifying major problems with local government delivery of its ‘duty to 
support’.  There is limited explanation.  The all-important and problematic 
relationship is unexplored between the citizen-planner groups and the institution of 
local government.  Theory on governance might suggest that ‘designated’ 
neighbourhood forums should be regarded very much as a part of a ‘governance 
network’ with shared responsibility and collective action.  However, the asymmetry of 
power and authority, and the dysfunctional relationships sometimes actually found, 
would support a doubtful view of networked governance.   Laffin (2014) endorses 
this scepticism, noting that hierarchy and centralism remain pervasive.  Some helpful 
conceptual clarification is supplied by Hildreth (2011) in a framework devised to 
enable exploration of the localism concept.  Hildreth offers both a simple typology of 
localism, together with a set of indicators with which to characterise each type.  This 
framework has potential as a tool for an analysis of post-2011 neighbourhood 
planning practice.  Hildreth’s model was slightly updated and modified by Evans et al 
(2013) so that there are three suggested types of localism.  A managerial localism, 
‘decided at the centre, but policy settings and delivery functions are devolved to the 
locality, under a strict regulatory framework’ (Evens et al p.402).  A representative 
localism is where single devolution occurs so that powers and responsibility are 
devolved to elected local government, which plays a community leadership role.  
Thirdly a community localism model is proposed where rights and support enable 
citizens collectively to engage directly in decisions and action in a form of 
participatory democracy.  Evens et al associate the managerial model with the 1997 
to 2010 Labour governments, and the community model with the 2010 to 2015 
Coalition government.  We now have the User Survey and Locality Commission 
providing an evidence base for further exploration of an explicitly community localism 
model.  There are some obvious questions.  For example, does neighbourhood 
planning enhance or challenge representative government?  That is to say, does 
localism more or less engage the public in local representative governance?  Is the 
development (typically in excess of two years) of a Neighbourhood Plan by the 
community a form of deliberative democracy?  The model, supplied by Evens et al, 
does offer a further means of conceptual clarification.  They suggest two alternative 
purposes.  Either community localism is intended to strengthen democratic 
engagement, or the rationale is conceived as a pragmatic means more effectively to 
deal with local economic and social problems (such as town planning).  This latter 
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intention necessitates, ‘a fusion between representative and community localism’ 
(Evens et al p.404).  There is a glaring omission here in the bulk of empirical and 
theoretical studies.  The ward councillor is potentially the link between community 
engagement and social purpose, and an agent for synergy between the formal 
institution and the citizen-planner groups.  Involved councillors might also supply an 
element of elective legitimacy.  There is only anecdotal evidence of some active (and 
correspondingly popular) ward councillors and some who shun engagement.  The 
2011 Act proclaims its raison d'être as encompassing both democratic and social 
purposes.  This split between democratic engagement and / or problem-solving is a 
simplification, but political scientists, planners and geographers alike contribute 
perspectives which reflect this duality.
In reviewing the academic literature some essentially constructivist objections 
to the 2011 ‘community’ version of localism, emerge.  This represents a profoundly 
sceptical school of thought.  The efficacy of the 2011 Act’s neighbourhood planning 
provisions is questioned, but also the motivations of the Acts sponsors.   Rejection of 
the potential for, or practice of, improved democratic engagement can be found, and 
also social justice concerns about the possibilities for the betterment of economic or 
social conditions.  Such a critique is available from Williams et al (2014) who argue 
that the Localism Act is driven by neoliberalism, so as to promote individualism and 
market-based technologies, which are inimical to local democracy and equity.  Even 
so, allowing that active community and protest groups can acquire the agenda, 
Williams et al note a subversive value in such transfers of power to the 
neighbourhood; ‘the changing architecture of governance brought about through the 
drive towards localism has opened up opportunities for the direct appropriation of 
governmental structures by local groups seeking progressive outcomes’ (Williams et 
al p.2809).  Clarke and Cochrane (2013) in an analysis of the 2011 localism rationale 
and its antecedents describe localism as ‘spatial liberalism’ and object that this is 
anti-political, ‘because elites, often unelected, set the procedures and agendas’ 
(Clarke and Cochran 2013 p.15).  Further; ‘this localism seeks to replace New 
Labour’s technocratic government, but it appears to be doing so with just another 
form of anti-politics: naïve, populist liberalism’ (Clarke and Cochran 2013 p.17).  It 
has been argued that the Localism Act is simply a covert means of promoting the 
private sector (Ludwig and Ludwig 2014).  Davoudi and Madanipour (2015), adopting 
Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’, that is to say the art and technology of 
government, warn of the dangers of the well organised and the well-off capturing 
decentralised planning.  They question the legitimacy of neighbourhood forums, 
contrasted with the elected legitimacy of councillors, highlighting the tension between 
representative and community versions of localism.  They acknowledge the populist 
appeal of, ‘romantic images of small groups bound together through cultural and 
geographical ties which collaborate reciprocally and locally to find local solutions for 
local problems’ (Davoudi and Madanipour p.78).  Such neoliberalism is seen as a 
replacement of welfare liberalism, resulting in a retreat from concerns about social 
justice.  Even so they conclude that localism can be progressive or regressive; 
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‘localism is a situated process that unfolds in specific contexts’ (Davoudi and 
Madanipour p.275).  In a rare London-based case study, Apostolides (2018) argues 
that neighbourhood forums confound localism’s democratic purposes since they are 
neither representative of the area, nor socially inclusive.  A neoliberal agenda has 
partly withdrawn the state, promoting self-interest over community interest.  Self-
appointed elites, ‘reap the benefits exclusive to their group, solidifying their 
advantageous socio-economic position’ (Apostolides p.230).  In the London context, 
such propositions might be informing or reinforcing putative institutional reluctance or 
political obstruction to localism.  Some of these contributions imply normative 
judgements about localism, imputing an ideological motivation to those who enacted 
the policy and inferring self-interested intentions of the citizens participating.  
Perhaps the definitive and nuanced theoretical evaluation, in the light of the 
extensive evidence from the User Experience study, is available from Parker, Lynn 
and Wargent (2015) who, between them, have contributed so extensively to 
research on neighbourhood planning.  Parker et al give a cautious welcome to 
neighbourhood planning, although they acknowledge the constraints of a neoliberal 
paradigm.  The reality falls well short of the ‘dialogic’ or collaborative planning 
desired, but based upon evidence from the research, neighbourhood planning, ‘may 
provide a platform for agenda setting and voice for communally-held views’ and 
further, ‘holds potential for a more pluralistic planning’ (Parker et al p.522). This is 
caveated with concerns; about resources, the ambiguous ‘duty to support’, non-
participating neighbourhoods; and the need to explore the conduct of local 
authorities.  Based directly upon what interviewees have said. Neighbourhood plans 
may act as a catalyst for further democratic engagement’ (Parker et al p.526).  
Although concerned with a dichotomy between civic interest and self-interest, 
Bradley (2017) notes that place and identity are crucial.  Participative democracy can 
prevail so that a; ‘complex struggle between alternative visions of the common good 
emerges’ (Bradley p.43).  Sturzaker and Shaw (2015) using a longitudinal case study 
have examined the possibilities but identify problems of capacity, participation and 
legitimacy.  Resolution; ‘rests to a not inconsiderable extent on commitment from the 
local authority’ (Sturzaker and Shaw p.604).  The means of making evaluations of 
efficacy are available.  Painter et al (2011) in a comprehensive review of localism 
were sceptical about claims for community ‘empowerment’ and devised four required 
conditions for the genuine article.  These are; statutory support, sufficient devolution, 
encouragement of ‘active civil society’ and localism as a policy priority.  Bailey and 
Pill (2015) review government attempts over a twenty year period to ‘empower’ local 
communities.  Two models of neighbourhood ‘localism’ are identified, which 
correspond to Hildreth’s ‘management’ and ‘community’ typology.  An earlier ‘state-
led’ model comprised central government targeting areas of deprivation, with 
performance indicators for service delivery.  This fits with Hildreth’s social and 
economic purposes.  The more recent 2011 ‘state enabling / self-help’ model is 
heavily dependent on local voluntarism.  Thus: ‘top-down, state-led policy initiatives 
tend to result in the least empowerment, whereas the more bottom-up, self-help, 
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state-enabled projects at least provide an opportunity to create the spaces where 
there is some potential for varying degrees of transformation’ (Bailey and Pill p.300).  
Stoker, in his defence of representative democracy, rejects accusations of anti-
politics, endorsing localism, which ‘enables the dimensions of trust, empathy and 
social capital to be fostered’ (Stoker 2006 p.176).  However, he is concerned about 
the danger of narrow parochialism.  Stoker advocates greater and various 
participation so as to promote the civic arena and he welcomes local tensions, 
‘Conflict between interests and their resolution remains at the heart of politics, 
wherever it is conducted’ (Stoker 2006 p.177).  Stoker also raises the social justice 
issue, about the need to address inequalities and to recognise, ‘both diversity in 
communities and a concern with equity issues’ (Stoker 2006 p.177.  Wills (2012) in a 
major study examining devolution in London, emphasised the importance of existing 
community infrastructures, such as churches.  Noting London’s high population 
turnover (‘limiting opportunities for place-based trust’), increasing diversity, and the 
social pressures, Wills nevertheless notes an increase in social capital and 
engagement in political life (Wills 2012 p.117).  Localism was found to aid community 
cohesion and create a sense of place-based common identity.  Wills argues this 
promotes a restored form of place-based urban governance at the neighbourhood 
level, affirming the community localism model.  Overall, most researchers do not find 
a neoliberal context necessarily inimical of community localism and, although the 
mediating role of local government is sometimes recognised, any systematic 
impediment by local government is not acknowledged.  There is a common currency, 
found in theory and in practice, of inherent issues with neighbourhood planning, 
centred on legitimacy, engagement, inclusion, and inequality.  Benchmarking of 
community localism against representative localism, in how the council deals with 
these issues is unavailable.  In other words, it is not known if the primary elected 
councils are more effective in overcoming deprivation, achieving inclusion and 
promoting citizen engagement than parish councils or neighbourhood forums.
LONDON APART: NEIGHBOURHOOD PLANNING AND BOROUGH 
GOVERNANCE
The lower and slower take-up of neighbourhood planning in London is 
demonstrated both in the disproportionately low numbers of active groups revealed 
by Parker et al (2016), but also in the recent data demonstrating that there are ten 
times more ‘made’ neighbourhood plans in England outside London than in London 
itself (Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (2018).  Population 
per made plan is a crude metric, but for comparison, the city of Leeds, with parish 
councils and strongly supportive of neighbourhood planning, has about the same 
proportion as England as a whole, while at the extreme, Arun District in Sussex (also 
parished) has about eight times more made plans than England as a whole.  
Manchester and Liverpool have no made plans.  The neighbourhood forum vehicle 
for citizen-led planning seems to be the basic problem.  In the absence of a parish 
council the self-starter groups are critically dependent on, and vulnerable to, their 
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local council.  Reluctance to support neighbourhood planning, or even obstruction, 
by local government was reported in both the User Experience and Locality 
Commission reports, although neither of these explored London’s anomalous 
circumstances.  Community localism is intrinsically problematic in urban areas 
lacking the advantages of pre-existing parish councils, (which arguably constitute a 
form of representative localism).  The difficulties for self-determined groups are well 
known: in defining and agreeing boundaries, mobilising a critical mass of citizens, 
getting funding, employing expertise and so on.  Obtaining council ‘designation’, has 
proved hard going in all but two of London’s boroughs; the pioneering Westminster 
(Conservative) and Camden (Labour) boroughs, with respectively 15 designated and 
12 designated groups in being.  The problems inherent in the neighbourhood forum 
model are not insuperable.  However, alleged council obstruction and reluctance to 
devolve power in London, is evidenced for example in a list of eight blocking tactics 
(Burton 2015).   The volunteer network of groups known as Neighbourhood 
Planners, London (2018) has monitored and reported online the progress of 
designations and referendums across London.  A survey was conducted of borough 
council support, so as to assess basic compliance with national planning guidance.  
Only six Local Plans in London fully recognised neighbourhood planning and 
provided guidance.  This included, as might be expected, the Local Plans published 
by the two supportive boroughs, Westminster and Camden.  Fifteen Local Plans 
supplied partial recognition, while nine Local Plans gave little or no recognition to 
neighbourhood planning (Neighbourhood Planners London 2017).  These latter 
boroughs promote their own community involvement strategies.  There is some 
correspondence between these three groups of boroughs (pro, indifferent and anti) 
and the actual levels of neighbourhood planning activity in each borough.  There are 
examples of displacement tactics, as with Lambeth Council, which spent £140,000 
producing a ‘refreshed masterplan’ rather than supporting the community’s 
neighbourhood planning group.  The relevant report mentions neighbourhood 
planning as one of five ‘risk factors’ (London Borough of Lambeth 2016 p.7).  
Boroughs like Lambeth appear to have a strict adherence to the ‘representative 
localism’ model, preferring an own-brand version of community engagement, even if 
this might conflict with the statutory duty to support neighbourhood planning.  
Another specific example of an alleged displacement tactic is available from 
Lambeth, where the South Bank and Waterloo Neighbours group has publically 
objected to the council’s separate ‘Cooperative Local Investment Plan’ (‘CLIP’) citing: 
‘locals who are concerned that the CLIP is an attempt to undermine a community-led 
exercise in favour of a council-led one’ (South Bank & Waterloo Neighbours 2018).   
Although the Localism Act had all-party support in parliament, there has been 
some differentiation in party policy, for example, the report on ‘One Nation Localism’ 
where the Labour party endorses a representative model of localism (Studdert 
2013).  The Labour Mayor’s recently published draft London Plan takes a similar 
position to the unsupportive boroughs on neighbourhood planning.  A discussion 
document by Neighbourhood Planners, London (2018a) points out that 
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neighbourhood planning is largely excluded from the London planning framework, 
which describes London’s ‘two-tier’, rather than the actual three-tier, planning 
system.  Various Mayoral policies, for town centres and regeneration, exclude the 
possible contribution of neighbourhood planning, despite the stated imperative for 
collaboration with local communities (Neighbourhood Planners, London 2018a p.8).  
A revealing example of the possible antipathy towards neighbourhood planning by 
London’s policy community, can be found in a report called ‘Making the Case for 
Place’ published in November 2017, following a year-long programme of 
professional meetings and field work.  The programme was devised and run by 
Future of London, a policy network for planning and regeneration professionals, from 
London government and private sector contractors.  The report is replete with 
guiding principles emphasising community engagement and partnership.  Local 
authorities and developers should fully employ the ‘planning levers’ while 
communities should; ‘Take opportunities to engage early in the planning process’ 
(Future of London 2017 p.28).  However nowhere in the report’s advice and case 
studies is neighbourhood planning enlisted, endorsed or referenced in any way.  
There is no debate.  This is a remarkable omission of the most devolved part of the 
National Planning framework, and might be described as a professional boycott, led 
by local government which pays the piper and calls the tune.   London borough 
governance has received very little research attention since it was reformed under 
the 2000 Local Government Act.  A wilful failure to co-operate with local communities 
exercising their 2011 rights and failure to meet the statutory duty to support would 
constitute a serious democratic deficit.  However, a recent democratic audit, 
assessing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, found that London 
(borough) government is ‘stable and effective’ and that ‘this is one of the better 
functioning parts of UK government’ (Travers 2018 p.346).  Even so, average 
electoral turnout in the 2018 council election was only 38.8% (easily exceeded by 
many neighbourhood planning referenda) and in three boroughs there are no 
opposition councillors.  The Communities and Local Government Select Committee 
looked at the effectiveness of overview and scrutiny committees and found that there 
is a serious accountability problem in local government.  Noting reports of high 
profile failures of scrutiny, such as the Grenfell fire in Kensington and Chelsea and 
vote rigging in Tower Hamlets, the committee found widespread weaknesses; ‘in 
many authorities there is no parity of esteem between the executive and scrutiny 
functions’ (Parliament, House of Commons (2017 p.3).  Based upon written evidence 
and witnesses, the report was highly critical of cabinet governance and of local party 
politics.  Organisational culture was highlighted as the most significant issue.  The 
coverage of the London boroughs in this parliamentary evaluation is unclear, but the 
report is a further prompt to a review of London borough governance.  Both of the 
national research projects, referred to earlier, emphasised the problematic 
responses of local authorities, and London borough governance would be an 




The two empirical investigations, in 2014 and 2017, into neighbourhood planning 
under the 2011 Act, have identified numerous hindrances and problems with this 
third tier of planning.  There is a close alignment of findings and recommendations in 
the two reports, which are unequivocal in concluding that local governance is the key 
determining factor in success, noting evidence of council reluctance, lack of support 
and even outright obstruction of neighbourhood planning.  The 2017 Localism 
Commission report, taking a somewhat evangelical stance to localism, identifies 
alleged local government ‘blocks to community power’ including top-down decision-
making, lack of accountability, lack of trust and poor access to data and information 
(Locality 2018 p.16).   The User Survey carried out in 2014, highlighted bureaucratic 
delays and lack of clarity in the 2011 Act, which led to technical recommendations 
incorporated into the Neighbourhood Planning Act 2017.  Policy weaknesses remain, 
such as the absence of objective criteria for success.  Progress in London, with only 
a tenth of the number of ‘made’ neighbourhood plans is markedly slower than in 
England as a whole.  The research methods employed by the two projects were 
likely to neglect unsuccessful groups, so there may be a hidden cohort of frustrated 
volunteers without voice, especially in London.  There was no investigation into the 
dynamics of communities which have considered and rejected neighbourhood 
planning, or commenced the proffered place-shaping, but given up.  London’s 
localism tardiness is unexplored, unexplained and worthy of investigation.  Research 
signposts are available in the comparable findings of the national reports and from 
extensive theory.  There is evidence at a London-wide level of reluctance by the 
political and professional policy community to support neighbourhood planning and, 
at borough level, of conservative policies and practices which are withholding 
support and hindering community take-up.  Arguably a devolution deficit.  The 
institutional climate of the borough councils would be central in a study of 
neighbourhood planning in London.  A policy analysis of the 32 boroughs is needed 
to identify the very different cultures and varied localism strategies in place.  
Opposition to neighbourhood planning is tacit however, abetted by an absence of 
debate.  A council is unlikely overtly to defy an act of parliament, and explicitly refuse 
its statutory ‘duty to support’.  This is an interesting research challenge; to surface 
such stealth opposition.  A tentative typology emerges of boroughs which are 
supportive (localist), those which are passive (tokenist) and those which employ 
displacement and other blocking tactics (contra-localist).  
Research perspectives on localism are suitably sceptical, but findings of a 
neoliberal project, anti-political in its effects, are not well supported by the two 
empirical studies, which find successful public engagement and tentative evidence of 
enhanced social capital.  The useful theoretical distinction made between a 
representative model and a community model of localism may assist in 
understanding the politics of localism in London, where evidence suggests that many 
in the policy community adhere to the representative model.  Senior officers and 
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members may be more comfortable retaining positional power, targeting limited 
community support by need.  Curiously, the potential role and agency of the ward 
councillor is unexplored.  Whether localism as a policy in London is ‘anti-political’ has 
not been tested.  Are communities which are working on their neighbourhood plan 
more or less engaged with politics, more or less trustful of politicians?  
Demonstrably, some councils’ are disinclined to support such groups, but why so?  
Such official conduct may itself constitute a form of institutionally-situated ‘anti-
politics’.  There remains however ample empirical evidence of unequal participation 
and a lack of inclusivity in communities, which may undermine the long-term 
sustainability of third tier planning.  Pragmatic and ideological objections in the 
literature to such social exclusion may reflect, and also inform, borough council 
policy, but this has hardly been investigated.  Survey and interview templates and 
policy proposals from the national studies are available to frame an investigation in 
London, which would enable comparative study.  Interpretive approaches, designed 
to include the otherwise voiceless and stalled groups, might be appropriate, 
particularly to explore extant questions about inclusivity, anti-politics, social capital 
and so on.  The two national studies suggest neighbourhood planning-based 
localism policy is a qualified success in its engagement purposes, but problematic, 
especially in London.  This paper argues that London is exceptionally deficient and 
apart in its achievement of the third tier of planning, largely because communities 
rely upon a flawed (practically and theoretically) neighbourhood forum model.  In 
turn, these forums are excessively dependent upon council support, which, by 
political choice, may be unforthcoming.  In effect, devolution denied.  A study of 
neighbourhood planning in London is needed with a focus upon the policy and 
practice of local governance.
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